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Abstract
In the early 1990’s, the Argentine government promoted a framework for
productivity-based negotiations between firms and unions at low levels of
organization. The policy weakened the industry-wide collective bargaining system,
which sets working conditions for all firms in an industry. This paper employs newly
developed quantile regression approaches to investigate the effect of union practices
on productivity within the context of the reform. The findings show that (i)
industry-wide practices on displacement of workers and training have a negative
impact on productivity; (ii) work practices do not appear to restrict economic efficiency
in the post-reform period; (iii) union practices on technology acquisition have an
adverse effect on high-productivity growth industries. Productivity seems to improve in
an economy promoting policies to weaken industry-wide collective bargaining.
JEL codes: J52; O14; O43; O54
Keywords: Work practices; Productivity; Manufacturing; Quantile regression
1 Introduction
Latin American economies are known for offering disappointing evidence in terms of
development. Argentina is a leading example of an economy falling behind the United
States and other Western world economies in the last half century. Although existing
theories offer different explanations, a conventional view focuses on government poli-
cies restricting competition and efficiency. Industry-wide work rules may be seen within
this view, because they set working conditions for heterogeneous firms in an industry at
a regional or national level. Thus, unions might generate inefficiencies associated with
restrictive work practices, having a negative impact on productivity. This paper offers
industry-level evidence that in an economy promoting policies to weaken industry-wide
collective bargaining, labor productivity in manufacturing improves.
Argentina’s labor market reforms in the early 1990’s invite an opportunity for estimat-
ing the effect of work practices on productivity. For decades, labor market institutions
had responded to a monopolistic (state-sanctioned) protection of unions by sectors, cen-
tralized bargaining including industry-wide work rules, and union contracts of indefinite
duration (Etchemendy 2001, O’Connell 1999). During the 1970’s and 1980’s, contracts
signed by industry had been dominating contracts signed by firms leading to what is
best known as industry-wide work rules. The hierarchy of contracts could have impor-
tant implications for efficiency and management’s ability to organize production since
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industry-wide agreements include binding standards applied throughout the industry.
Since the reforms in the early 1990’s, the government implemented policies promoting
firm-level collective agreements that were bargained at low levels of organization (Tuman
and Morris 1998). This includes a decentralization framework for collective bargaining
and negotiations based on productivity. Although the reforms were in practice only par-
tially effective, they affected industrial relations in the manufacturing sector. For instance,
several contracts in the automobile industry were limited to the utilization of high quality
production techniques.
Our identification strategy is based on the comparison of manufacturing industries
whose workers are covered by contracts bargained after the reforms and industries whose
workers are covered by contracts bargained before the reforms, when unions played a
major role at the industry and national level. It is naturally challenging to investigate
how work practices including rules on technology acquisition affect productivity levels
and growth, but the exercise should offer a credible measure of the effect of industry-
wide work rules. First, the policy change should be perceived as exogenous relative to the
manufacturing industries because the reforms were part of Argentina’s market-oriented
structural reforms that include a liberalization program, privatized public enterprises, and
measures to deregulate the economy. Second, it is possible to find work rules that were
bargained between firms and unions from samples of collective agreements signed before
and after the labor reforms. We develop a unique union contract data set that includes
union practices on capital acquisition affecting manufacturing firms located in different
states. To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first one that uses union contract data
in a developing country to examine the effect of work practice changes on productivity.
Although the reform may be considered to be exogenous, work practices are sus-
pected to be endogenous because unions and firms bargain on practices and productivity
after the reforms. In order to investigate this possibility empirically, we employ clas-
sical instrumental variable approaches for estimating a difference-in-difference model.
The specification includes industry effects and state effects. To instrument a work rule
bargained in an industry located in a state, we use length of contracts and number of
employees covered by union contracts in other industries located in other states. These
instruments capture variation created by the reforms that is not related to productivity
advances in the industry. The sets of instruments pass standard tests used by practitioners
in all the specifications. The evidence shows that industry-wide practices on displace-
ment of workers and capital acquisition have a negative impact on productivity. However,
in the period after the reforms, union practices do not appear to restrict economic effi-
ciency. This evidence might be interpreted as suggesting that policies designed to weaken
the industry-wide collective agreements increased firm’s efficiency in the manufacturing
sector.
A recent body of the literature investigates the distributional effect of policy (see, e.g.,
Bandiera et al. 2010, Bitler et al. 2006). While the empirical literature traditionally has
focused upon estimating how unions affect mean productivity, this approach may be
incomplete if industry-wide rules do not similarly impact low- and high- productiv-
ity industries. As in Bandiera et al. 2010, we model heterogeneity of effects throughout
a quantile regression model. We can use instrumental variable and panel data quan-
tile regression approaches to estimate the models (Chernozhukov and Hansen (2006,
2008), Harding and Lamarche 2009, Koenker 2004). Existing methods, however, are
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not well suited for investigating the effect of practices on our productivity equation.
We simply accommodate the approaches proposed in Koenker (2004) and Harding and
Lamarche (2009) to estimate the distributional effect of work practices on the con-
ditional response distribution. We find that practices on capital acquisition have a
small negative impact at the lower tail of the conditional productivity growth distri-
bution, suggesting that this practice has a modest negative effect on low-productivity
growth industries. On the other hand, practices on technology acquisition seem to
have an adverse effect on high-productivity growth industries, decreasing productiv-
ity by 6.7%. The results for the period post-reform suggest that productivity growth
improves 3.6% under weakened industry-wide practices on the incorporation of new
technology.
Union practices affecting economic efficiency have received extensive attention from
theorists and applied economists. Theoretical support for the effect of working rules on
aggregate output growth is given by Holmes and Schmitz (1995), Parente and Prescott
(1999, 2000), Prescott (1998), Cole et al. (2005), and Bental and Demougin (2006). Holmes
and Schmitz (1995) show that better technology is not adopted in an economy where
workers have some degree of monopoly power. Prescott (1998) argues that work prac-
tices affect economic efficiency. In Parente and Prescott (1999), the coalition of factor
suppliers set work practices and wages, and make it difficult to enter the market with
a more productive technology. Inferior technologies are used, and consequently there is
less growth in output. Cole et al. (1999) argue that international and domestic competitive
barriers explain why Latin America economies have not followed Western economies
success.
The large existing empirical evidence is controversial. The literature reports positive
and negative overall union productivity effects consistent with the fact that unions have
two “faces”. Freeman and Medoff (1984) initiated a debate by pointing out that potential
increases in productivity are induced by unions that provide workers a collective voice
in the workplace. In contrast, unions may reduce productivity by reallocation and inef-
ficiency associated with restrictive work rules (Bremmels 1987).1 The mixed empirical
evidence of the effect of unions on productivity covers a variety of industries including
manufacturing, construction, and services in the United States and United Kingdom. A
few papers, notably Ferreira and Rossi (2003) and Galiani and Sturzenegger (2008), have
studied the effect of unions in Latin America. Our empirical approach, that uses data
before and after a policy change, is similar to the one used in Ferreira and Rossi (2003).
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces a theoretical framework.
Section 3 presents institutional details and describes the union contract data set con-
structed in this paper. While Section 4 briefly presents models and methods, Section 5
presents empirical results. Section 6 concludes.
2 A simplemodeling framework
This section presents a framework following the literature on unionization structures and
incentives to adopt new technology. We develop a simple extension of the model intro-
duced in Haucap and Wey (2002, 2004) to analyze the effect of industry-wide bargaining
on technology adoption. Under firm-level negotiations, the union of the less efficient firm
accepts working conditions to maintain the firm competitiveness in the product mar-
ket. On the other hand, under industry-wide negotiations, an industry union exploits its
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monopoly power. This section shows that investment incentives which depend on how
productivity enhancing technology affects firms’ profit can be lower under industry-wide
bargaining than under firm level bargaining.
Consider two firms i = {1, 2} in an industry m producing an homogeneous product.
We assume an inverse linear demand function p = A − q1 − q2, with A > q1 + q2.
The good offered by firm i, qi, is produced by employing labor li, which is the only
input in the production process. Firm 1 has the opportunity of introducing an innova-
tion that reduces the labor requirement per unit of output by φ paying a cost c.2 The
(sunk) cost of implementing the innovation, c, is exogenous and can be seen as measur-
ing the severity of a hold-up problem.3 The total cost of employing one unit of labor
wi is set by unions. The variable includes wages and other costs per unit of labor asso-
ciated with working practices described in union contracts. Workers have an outside
option w0.
There are three stages in the game. In the first stage, firm 1 decides whether to imple-
ment an innovation φ. In the second stage, unions set wi considering firm’s setting their
employment level li. Work rules including wages can be set at the industry-level by a
union that maximizes the industry benefit bill UI(wi,wj) = ∑2i=1 li(wi − w0). The alter-
native, competing structure is characterized by a union maximizing the firm’s benefit bill,
UF(wi,wj) = li(wi−w0). The solutions of these problems are denoted by (wI1,wI2,wF1 ,wF2 ).
Finally, in the last stage, firms compete in quantities taking productivity levels and the
cost of labor as given.
The incentive to innovate 1 is defined as the profit differential between the profit of
firm 1 when an innovation is implemented, 1(w1,w2,φ), and the profit of firm 1 when
an innovation is not implemented,1(w1,w2, 0). Note however that the profit differential
depends on the level of negotiation. We denote F1 the incentive to innovate under firm-
level negotiations and I1 the incentive to innovate under industry-level negotiations.
Therefore, the value of the incentive differential 1 = I1 − F1 measures the incentive
of implementing a labor productivity innovation under industry-wide agreements. For
productivity increases φ < 1/3, it is possible to show that the incentive differential 1
is negative, implying that firm 1’s incentive to adopt new technology under industry-wide
collective agreements is lower than firm 1’s incentive under firm-level collective agree-
ments. An implication of this result is that industry-wide bargaining is expected to have
an adverse effect on productivity, with the largest negative impact on high productivity
industries.4
3 Collective bargaining in Argentina
3.1 Institutional details
There have been no changes in the institutional features of Argentina’s industrial relations
in the period 1973–1990 in which its GDP per capita decreased (Figure 1). The coun-
try’s traditional collective bargaining system included centralized negotiations between
unions and firms affecting millions of workers. The two most important aspects of cen-
tralized negotiations were the extensive (monopolistic) protection (O’Connell 1999) and
the industry-wide work rules (Bronstein 1978). Traditionally, few unions were allowed to
represent workers in collective bargaining and strikes, a status called “personería gremial”.
Once bargaining rights have been granted to a high-level union, low-level agreements are
not possible. Industry-wide practices refer to work rules introduced by high-level industry
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Figure 1 Argentina’s per capita gross domestic product (GDP) and a productivity index in the
automobile industry in the period 1950–2000. The source of the productivity index is Asociación de
Fábricas de Automotores (ADEFA) and Catalano and Novick (1998).
agreements that set standards to other (lower-level) agreements. For example, if at the
industry level it is established that the wage is w¯, firms and workers must bargain over a
wage that is at least w¯.5
In the early 1990’s, Argentina made considerable progress on implementing market-
oriented structural reforms.6 The major changes in the labor market institutions were:
(a) the decentralization of the negotiation process and (b) the introduction of negotia-
tions based on productivity (Cardozo and Gindin 2009). Although the reforms and the
implementation of the policies were fairly complex in nature, the agreement in the lit-
erature is that the reforms undermined the hierarchy of the traditional industry-wide
collective negotiations. The government implemented policies promoting firm-level col-
lective agreements that were bargained at low levels of organization (Tuman and Morris
1998). For instance, the decree 2284 written in 1991 indicates that unions and employ-
ers have the right to “choose the level of negotiation they consider appropriate” in new
or renegotiated collective agreements. After the reforms were introduced, the number of
beneficiaries per contract decreased and contracts at low levels of organization doubled
in percentage.
Flexible working hours, flexible contracts and flexible organization of work were also
introduced in new and renewed contracts. The collective agreements in the automobile
industry, nicely described in Catalano and Novick (1998), provide an interesting and illus-
trative example of the changes. A number of collective agreements written in 1975 were
extended without changes in the automobile industry, but other contracts were modi-
fied. For instance, the system of 8 to 10 categories agreed in 1975 was reduced to four
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occupational categories in the early 1990’s. The productivity in the automobile industry
increased dramatically after the introduction of the reforms (Figure 1).
3.2 A description of the union data
Our analysis focuses on a sample of collective agreements in the manufacturing sec-
tor in the period 1973–1994 (Table 1). Basic information about the population of union
contracts in manufacturing industries can be found in Aldao-Zapiola et al. (1994). In
Appendix, they offer a comprehensive list of collective agreements by rounds of negotia-
tion that includes number of the contract and year. From this list of union contracts, we
draw a sample of collective agreements after we stratify the population by rounds of nego-
tiation.7 Subsequently, we proceed to obtain copies of the selected collective agreements.
A large proportion of contracts were made available to us from the samples analyzed in
Aldao-Zapiola et al. and the ones that were not available were obtained from the library
of the Ministerio de Trabajo de la Nación Argentina (Argentina’s Labor Department) and
its website.8
A breakdown of the contracts by negotiation round is offered in Table 1. The table
reports number of contracts and average number of employees covered by collective
agreements. For comparative purposes, we offer information on the entire population
of manufacturing contracts. It is immediately apparent than our sample includes major
agreements, because 36.8 percent of contracts covers 60.7 percent of workers. Corre-
sponding to the population trend, most contracts show sizable decline in the number of
beneficiaries over time. The table also shows the proportion of renegotiated contracts.
Only 10 manufacturing contracts written between 1973 and 1990 were renegotiated after
the reforms were implemented in the early 1990’s. It is interesting to note however that
renegotiated contracts have, on average, more beneficiaries than other manufacturing
contracts.
Bargaining units can be classified into four groups: establishment (plant), firm (mul-
tiplant), area and industry. Our sample of collective agreements includes industry level
contracts and firm level contracts written before and after the reforms. In industry level
contracts, unions and employers’ associations bargain over working conditions that are
Table 1 Contracts and workers covered by collective agreements in themanufacturing
industry
Collective agreements in the First round Second round Third round
manufacturing sector 1973–1976 1988–1990 1991–1994
Entire population of union contracts
Total number of contracts 218 115 31
Workers covered by contracts 2327859 983173 203315
Workers per contract 10678 8549 6559
Sample of union contracts
Total number of contracts 47 56 31
Workers covered by contracts 1105640 824800 203315
Workers per contract 23524 14728 6559
Number of renegotiated contracts 6 4 1
Workers covered by renegotiated contracts 213400 82000 8000
Workers per renegotiated contract 35567 20500 8000
Percentage of renegotiation after reforms 12.7 7.1 3.2
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applied throughout the industry. In firm level contracts, a firm with multiple estab-
lishments negotiates with a national or regional union. In our sample of major union
contracts, the proportion of industry contracts decreased 11 percent in the 1990’s,
although there was a significant reduction in the number of beneficiaries per contract that
exceeded 55 percent. This last number reflects in part the weakening of the industry-wide
bargaining. Industry level contracts were not restrictive in the period after the reforms,
because provisions negotiated between industry unions and employers’ associations were
not necessarily applied to bargaining units at lower levels.
The impact of the reforms on the bargaining process can be alternatively described
using the geographical coverage of the collective agreements. Their coverage is lim-
ited to a firm, a state, a number of states, or it can be national in character. In our
sample of manufacturing agreements, 17 percent of the contracts are binding within
a particular city, state or region. For instance, the collective agreement 167 signed in
1975 covered manufactures of quebracho extracts.9 The collective agreement covers
the Argentine Chaco region including the provinces of Santiago del Estero and Santa
Fe. Local agreements could also be possible by national unions with local represen-
tation and affiliation. The collective agreement of General Motors Argentina in the
1990’s was signed by the union of the province of Córdoba, where the main plant of
the firm is located. As shown in Figure 2, the reforms introduced in the early 1990’s
significantly increased the proportion of regional and firm contracts at low levels of
organization, although industry bargaining remained widespread in the period after the
reforms.
Using the sample of manufacturing contracts, we identify 16 commonly included
practices. Work rules can be categorized into 6 groups: working conditions, rede-
ployment, hiring and layoffs, working week, featherbedding and capital acquisition
(Table 2). An example of practices on technology can be found in the collective agree-
ment between the Union of Chemical and Petrochemicals industry and the Argentine
Chamber of the Chemical and Petrochemical industry signed in 1989. The contract,
Nation Region Firm
Industry−level negotiation




















































Figure 2 The effect of 1990’s reforms on negotiations. Regional coverage refers to an agreement binding
within a city, a state or a region.
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Table 2Work rules classification and dummy variable description
Work rules Before After Dummy variable description:
reforms reforms
1. Working conditions
a. Security 0.680 0.555 Does the contract include practices associated with
(0.469) (0.502) safety in the workplace?
b. Equipment 0.874 0.888 Is the company committed to provide
(0.333) (0.317) job equipment?
c. Hygiene 0.213 0.185 Does the contract include norms associated with
(0.411) (0.392) a healthy work environment?
2. Redeployment
a. Promotions 0.204 0.167 Does the contract include explicit rules
(0.404) (0.376) on promotions within the establishment?
b. Redeployment 0.815 0.537 Does the collective agreement include practices
(0.390) (0.503) on redistribution of workers and rehiring?
c. Leave and absence 0.689 0.592 Does the contract include worker’s right to get back
(0.465) (0.503) to work in case of leaves and absences?
3. Hiring & Layoffs
a. Staff reduction 0.349 0.148 Does the contract includes rules
(0.479) (0.358) on discharges and suspensions?
b. Vacancies 0.631 0.685 Does the contract include working rules
(0.485) (0.468) on recruitment of workers?
4. Working Week
a. Holidays 0.427 0.462 Does the contract explicitly mention
(0.497) (0.503) holidays?
b. Vacations 0.447 0.460 Does the contract include practices and indicates
(0.499) (0.504) the duration of annual vacations?
c. Weekly rest 0.563 0.518 Does the collective agreement include
(0.498) (0.504) rules on weekly rest?
d. Working week 0.398 0.574 Does the contract include rules on the duration of
(0.491) (0.499) the working week and hours worked per day?
5. Featherbedding
a. Displacement 0.184 0.093 Does the contract include norms on workers displaced
(0.389) (0.292) by a technological change or a fall in demand?
b. Categories 0.582 0.333 The contract indicates number and description
(0.495) (0.476) of occupational categories
6. Capital Acquisition
a. Technology 0.184 0.185 Unions and managers bargain over
(0.389) (0.392) incorporation of new technology
b. Training 0.339 0.259 Do contracts include norms to maintain or implement
(0.476) (0.442) programs of professional training and development?
Standard deviations are presented in parentheses.
which sets working conditions for all firms in the industry and covers 23,000 work-
ers, states that both parties need to agree on improving productivity and new methods
and technologies. In contrast, the agreement at the firm level between Ford Motor
Argentina and the Mechanics Union (SMATA) states that the company can intro-
duce new production methods and technology. The primary focus of this paper is
related to the following question: Do featherbedding and capital acquisition work rules
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3.3 A description of the industry data
The industry data is obtained from the Argentine Economic Census, which is anal-
ogous to the economic census of the U.S. Census Bureau. It was conducted in
1974, 1985 and 1994 by the Argentine National Institute of Statistics and Census
(INDEC) and has the advantage of including information on the state where an
industry is located. Production data is provided at the four-digit International
Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) level. To define industries consistently over
time, it is important to standardize the industry definitions used in the 1974 cen-
sus (ISIC Rev.2) and 1994 census (ISIC Rev.3). Taking into consideration restric-
tions imposed by industry definitions and data availability, the production data
used in this study includes 55 Argentine manufacturing industries located in 24
provinces.
Our measure of efficiency is constructed as industry net output divided by num-
ber of workers. This is due to lack of data on labor and capital to create better
measures of productivity.10 We present additional details and data sources in the
Appendix.
3.4 Data construction
The construction of the data set used in this paper involved the following main steps:
(1) classification of contracts according to the four-digit ISIC level of aggregation; (2)
identification of manufacturing industries and standardization of the industry definitions
over time; (3) qualitative analysis of practices included in the contracts and construction
of industry-wide work rules.
In step (3), we were able to construct two measures of industry work rules. For
each of the 55 manufacturing industries, we created time series of the work rules
described in Table 2 in each of the 24 Argentine provinces. If work practices were
bargained in firm-level contracts, we aggregated them to the four-digit ISIC level.
Our first measure simply indicates whether union contracts in industry i located






where Kist denotes the number of contracts and ξkist is an indicator variable for whether
union contract k includes a work practice.
Using Figure 3, we illustrate the changes of the work rule W after the reforms
in each of the manufacturing industries considered in our paper. The figure presents
the total number of work rules in union contracts negotiated before and after the
policy reform. We see that the new institutional setting generated changes in work
practices that were not uniformly extended across manufacturing industries. Thus,
we can investigate productivity growth differences between industries by examining
variation in work practices over time and across industries. In the next section, we




















































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3 Bargained practices in collective agreements before and after the policy change.
4 Models andmethods
We begin with a simple productivity equation given by,
yist = δ1Wist + δ2At + δ3AWist + x′istβ + ist , (4.1)
where the unit of observation is the productivity of industry i in state s at time t. The
variable yist is defined as the logarithm of the quantity of net output qist divided by the
number of workers list . The variable yist may also measure productivity growth. While
the variable Wist indicates whether union contracts affecting industry i include a work
practice, the variable At is an indicator variable for years after the policy reform initiated
in 1991. The variable AWist is defined as the product of the indicator for a bargained work
rule,Wist , and the indicator variable for years after the policy change, At . The model also
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includes a set of independent variables, xist . These variables are described in detail in the
Appendix. Lastly, the variable ist is the error term.
4.1 Estimation
The model presented in equation (4.1) can be tentatively estimated using simple regres-
sion methods. The coefficient δ1 measures the difference in the conditional expected
value of labor productivity between industries whose workers bargain over work rule W
and industries whose workers do not bargain over work rule W. The coefficient δ2 mea-
sures the differences in the expected value of productivity after the policy change. The
coefficient δ3 measures the difference between productivity of industries whose workers
bargain over W and industries whose workers do not bargain over W, after the policy
change. The changes in the labor legislation and the presence of less prevalent industry-
wide work rules after the Argentina’s reform in the early 1990’s would imply a positive
coefficient δ3. However, results from estimating (4.1) may be biased because industry
latent heterogeneity is likely to be correlated withW.
4.1.1 Unobserved heterogeneity
We consider a variation of model (4.1) that includes industry effect αi’s and state effect
μs’s. The industry effects represent differences in managerial abilities and sector exter-
nalities affecting labor productivity that are constant over time and across state. The state
effects capture industry-invariant and time-invariant differences in regional productiv-
ity. After introducing these effects, the previous model can be rewritten using a more
convenient notation,
yist = d′istδ + x′istβ + αi + μs + uist , (4.2)
where δ = (δ1, δ2, δ3)′, dist = (Wist ,At ,AWist)′. This model can be easily estimated
considering fixed effects methods (see, e.g., Baltagi 2008 and Hsiao 2003). Under the
assumption that E(uist|dist , xist ,αi,μs) = 0, the results are expected to be unbiased. Fol-
lowing the recent literature on inconsistent standard errors in panel data, we cluster the
standard errors at the province level (e.g., Angrist and Pischke 2009; Cameron et al. 2008,
2010; Stock and Watson 2008).
4.1.2 Endogenous covariates
Since in the 1990’s unions and firms bargained over work rules and productivity,
we estimate equation (4.2) using Two Stage Least Squares (TSLS) methods. The sus-
pected endogenous variables (Wist ,AWist) are instrumented using the average number of
employees covered by union contracts and the average length of contracts in other indus-
tries and states. These instruments should capture variation associated with the policy
reforms that is unrelated to productivity advances in industry i located in state s.
4.2 A quantile regression approach
A growing body of the literature investigates the distributional effects of policy (see, e.g.,
Bandiera et al. 2010; Bitler et al. 2006). The studies show that the conditional mean model
may provide an incomplete description of the effect of a policy on the outcome of inter-
est. This section introduces two simple approaches designed to overcome the limitations
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of classical methods in the presence of heterogeneous policy effects, while addressing
individual heterogeneity and the possibility of endogenous covariates.
A quantile regression version of model (4.2) is,
QYist (τ |dist , xist ,αi,μs) = d′istδ(τ ) + x′istβ(τ ) + αi(τ ) + μs(τ ), (4.3)
where τ is a quantile in (0, 1) and Q(·|·) is the τj-th conditional quantile function. The
parameter (δ(τ )′,β(τ )′)′ provides an opportunity for investigating how the policy vari-
ables and other independent variables influence the location, scale and shape of the
conditional distribution of our productivity measure. For instance, if we have an identi-
cally, independently distributed error term distributed as F and one covariate Wist , the
quantile functionsQYit (τ |·) are parallel lines with parameter (β0(τ ), δ1))′, and the distance
between them is the difference between the intercept terms. It is possible, however, that
δ1(τ ) changes with the quantile τ , suggesting lines with different slopes.
In this paper, we accommodate existing methods to estimate the conditional quan-
tile function (4.3). We first introduce a simple extension to the fixed effects estimator
proposed by Koenker (2004), allowing for industry and state location shift effects on
the conditional quantiles of labor productivity. Let C(·) be the summation of quantile
regression check functions,







ρτ (yist − d′istδ − x′istβ − αi − μs), (4.4)
where ρτ is the classical quantile regression check function (see, e.g., Koenker 2005). We
follow Koenker’s approach of jointly estimating the parameter of interest and the nuisance
parameters, because standard panel data transformations are not available in quantile
regression. An estimator for a model with industry and state effects is defined as,
(δˆ(τ )′, βˆ(τ )′, αˆ(τ )′, μˆ(τ )′)′ = argmin {C(τ ; δ,β ,α,μ)} . (4.5)
To address a potential problem of endogenous covariates, we accommodate the method
proposed by Harding and Lamarche (2009). Consider the objective function for the
conditional instrumental quantile relationship that is given by:







ρτ (yist − d′istδ − x′istβ − αi − μs − wˆ′istγ ), (4.6)
where the term wˆist is the vector of instruments introduced by Chernozhukov andHansen
(2006). In practice, it is possible to construct wˆ by a least squares projection of the endoge-
nous variables d on the instruments w, exogenous variables x and individual effects.
The procedure in Harding and Lamarche (2009) is similar to the one developed by
Chernozhukov and Hansen (2006, 2008) and proceeds in two steps. First they minimize
the objective function above for β , α, μ, and γ as functions of τ and δ,
{βˆ(τ , δ), αˆ(τ , δ), μˆ(τ , δ), γˆ (τ , δ)} = argmin {R(τ , δ;β , γ ,α)} . (4.7)
Then they estimate the coefficient on the endogenous variable d by finding the value of δ,
which the following quadratic function defined on γ :
δˆ(τ ) = argmin
δ∈D
{
γˆ (τ , δ)′Aγˆ (τ , δ)} , (4.8)
for a given positive definite matrix A.11 To obtain standard errors and do basic inference,
we simply accommodate the covariancematrices obtained in Koenker (2004) andHarding
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and Lamarche (2009). The interested reader can find additional details in Chernozhukov
and Hansen (2006, 2008), Koenker (2005), and Lamarche (2010).
5 Empirical results
This section presents results on basic regression models that are employed to document
the effect of work rules on labor productivity in the Argentine manufacturing industry.
Tables 3 and 4 present evidence of the effect of work rules on two measures of productiv-
ity. While columns (1) and (2) present results for labor productivity equations, columns
Table 3 Results of the effect of individual work rules on productivity
Labor productivity specifications
Individual working rules Level Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Displacement -0.331† -0.321‡ -0.488‡ -0.475‡
(0.152) (0.191) (0.239) (0.262)
After reforms 2.130∗ 2.129∗ 1.052‡ 1.048∗
(0.350) (0.197) (0.515) (0.269)
Displacement after reforms 0.367∗ 0.364 0.544† 0.546‡
(0.120) (0.227) (0.259) (0.305)
F-test (p-value) - 0.000 - 0.000
Sargan test (p-value) - 0.209 - 0.330
Categories -0.628∗ -0.616∗ -0.779 -0.763∗
(0.162) (0.185) (0.465) (0.246)
After reforms 2.053∗ 2.056∗ 1.250† 1.250∗
(0.404) (0.209) (0.573) (0.285)
Categories after reforms 0.340‡ 0.336 0.020 0.021
(0.177) (0.224) (0.412) (0.302)
F-test (p-value) - 0.000 - 0.000
Sargan test (p-value) - 0.757 - 0.870
Technology -0.195 -0.192 -0.421 -0.415
(0.195) (0.206) (0.271) (0.287)
After reforms 1.863∗ 1.860∗ 0.776 0.767∗
(0.357) (0.187) (0.555) (0.256)
Technology after reforms 0.905∗ 0.910∗ 1.183† 1.197∗
(0.243) (0.254) (0.438) (0.351)
F-test (p-value) - 0.000 - 0.000
Sargan test (p-value) - 0.780 - 0.158
Training -0.545† -0.546∗ -0.867∗ -0.869∗
(0.223) (0.211) (0.278) (0.291)
After reforms 1.861∗ 1.857∗ 0.837 0.819∗
(0.364) (0.199) (0.521) (0.270)
Training after reforms 0.970∗ 0.977∗ 1.196∗ 1.225∗
(0.215) (0.280) (0.305) (0.383)
F-test (p-value) - 0.000 - 0.000
Sargan test (p-value) - 0.671 - 0.910
Basic and additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
State effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 1030 1030 899 899




Lamarche IZA Journal of Labor & Development Page 14 of 25
Table 4 The effect of complementary work rules on productivity
Labor productivity specifications
Complementary practices Levels Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Displacement -0.649∗ -0.649∗ -1.088∗ -1.089∗
(0.136) (0.244) (0.302) (0.329)
Categories -0.772† -0.749∗ -0.588 -0.560
(0.303) (0.285) (0.646) (0.381)
Technology 0.123 0.117 -0.025 -0.034
(0.211) (0.286) (0.353) (0.391)
Training -0.328 -0.329 -0.667† -0.666‡
(0.251) (0.279) (0.312) (0.386)
After reforms 1.630∗ 1.631∗ 0.676 0.670†
(0.398) (0.239) (0.556) (0.327)
Displacement after reforms -0.247 -0.236 0.129 0.143
(0.276) (0.275) (0.381) (0.371)
Categories after reforms 0.195 0.188 -0.367 -0.372
(0.280) (0.275) (0.504) (0.371)
Technology after reforms 0.831† 0.843‡ 1.193† 1.216†
(0.355) (0.449) (0.505) (0.603)
Training after reforms 0.799∗ 0.786† 1.038∗ 1.024†
(0.260) (0.383) (0.302) (0.516)
F-test (p-value) - 0.000 - 0.000
Sargan test (p-value) - 0.695 - 0.568
Basic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
State effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 1030 1030 899 899
The symbols ‡,†,∗ denote statistically different from zero at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level of significance. Clustered standard errors
are in parentheses.
(3) and (4) present results for productivity growth equations. All the variations of the
models include, in addition to the variables of interest, industry and state fixed effects,
and control variables (see the Appendix for amore detailed description of the variables).12
5.1 Panel data results
The results presented in column (1) of Table 3 indicate that displacement practices have
a significant, negative effect on productivity, suggesting that contracts with practices on
displacement of workers might limit manager’s ability to do work in the most efficient
manner. We find, however, that these practices seem to positively affect productivity in
the period after the reforms. The evidence seems to imply that work-wide practices limit
management effectiveness to conduct production operations, but practices are effective
if they are not imposed by high-level negotiations.
Moreover, the results in column (1) suggest that industries with contracts that include
practices on occupational categories and training have lower productivity than indus-
tries with contracts that do not include these work rules. The effect of practices on
technology acquisition is negative, but insignificant at standard levels. We also find that
practices on physical and human capital acquisition lead to productivity advances in the
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period after the reforms. Lastly, the evidence presented in column (3) suggests that prac-
tices on physical and human capital bargained after the reforms increase productivity
growth.13
5.2 Instrumental variable results
The period of negotiation characterized by industry-wide work practices imposed
a unified view on ways of conceiving and implementing productivity-based meth-
ods. In the early 1990’s, the collective agreements introduced alternative methods
of evaluating and rewarding productivity (Catalano and Novik 1998). If these prac-
tices are negotiated at the industry level and are correlated with industry latent
innovation or state’s productivity, our previous results represent unbiased estimates
of the effects of interest. The fixed effects strategies employed in columns (1) and
(3) of Table 3 would provide reliable estimates of the policy parameter. However,
one may argue that industries’ level of innovation did not remain constant in the
period after the policy change, and therefore, practices could be negotiated more
often in industries with high level of innovation. We employ TSLS methods in mod-
els with fixed effects to account for the possibility of an endogenous policy vari-
able.
Ideally, we would like to use as instruments external shocks to the industry that hit the
negotiation process but not industry productivity. The reform introduced in the 1990’s
represents an external shock, but practices are suspected to be endogenous because
unions and firms bargain over practices that affect productivity. To instrument work
rule W bargained in industry i and state s, we use average number of employees cov-
ered by union contracts and average length of contracts in other industries located in
other states.14 The instruments represent features of the weakening of the industry-wide
collective bargaining uncorrelated with latent determinants of productivity in industry i
in state s. It might be possible however that aggregate shocks over time drive produc-
tivity and negotiations in other states but the model includes a variable that captures
time effects common across industries and states, At . In addition, the models are esti-
mated using clustered standard errors. Thus, the number of employees and contract’s
duration in other industries that are distant to industry i in state s capture variation
associated with the policy reforms that is unrelated to productivity advances in industry
i.15 Table 3 offers evidence that the instruments pass the standard test of overidentifi-
cation, and instruments and endogenous variables are strongly correlated (see also the
Appendix).
Table 3 presents instrumental variable results of the effect of work practices on
productivity and productivity growth. The results presented in column (2) suggest
that productivity is higher in industries with contracts that do not include industry-
wide rules on displacement of workers and categories of workers. We also find that
practices on technology and training after the policy change increase productivity.
Therefore, the evidence continues to suggest that the policies that weakened the
traditional industry-wide collective agreements increased productivity in the manu-
facturing sector. The results for the productivity growth equations estimated in col-
umn (4) also indicate a significant effect of the policy. Physical and human capital
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5.3 Complementary practices
The existing empirical literature examines the effect of individual work practices on
productivity as well as the effect of clusters of complementary practices on productiv-
ity (see, e.g., Bartel 1995 and Ichniowski et al. 1997). Complementary work rules may
be advantageous because one work rule may be more effective if it is adopted with
other practices that stimulate worker’s productivity. Therefore, there may exist produc-
tivity gains arising from adopting one practice along with other work practices. The
theoretical literature seems to also support the notion that policies should be ana-
lyzed within a coherent incentive system (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1994, Milgrom and
Roberts 1990).
Tomodel the possibility of cluster of complementary practices, we estimate amodel that
incorporates the practices analyzed in Table 3. Using Table 4, we show results from esti-
mating simultaneously the effect of featherbedding and capital acquisition practices on
our measures of productivity.We find that while industry-wide practices on displacement
of workers and categories have an adverse effect on productivity, technology and training
bargained after the reforms seem to increase productivity. Moreover, the results shown in
column (4) continue to suggest that practices on technology and training introduced after
the government weakened industry-wide agreements have a positive, significant effect on
productivity growth.
5.4 The distributional effect of the policy reform
The reforms would similarly impact low- and high- productivity industries if
industry-wide bargaining would have equally restricted firms level of efficiency across
industries. However, the reforms could affect industries differently, because the pro-
ductivity impact of a marginal firm that becomes able to adopt an innovation under
the decentralized framework is larger in a high-productivity industry than in a low-
productivity industry. In this section, we focus on the heterogeneous effects of the
policy reform across the conditional distribution of productivity advances by esti-
mating quantile regression models with fixed effects. We use instrumental vari-
ables to estimate a productivity growth equation similar to the one presented in
Table 3. In addition to the effect of the policy, we include indicators for type of
contracts, type of workers covered by the contract, geographical coverage of the con-
tract, state’s population, real gross geographical product per capita and the shares of
employment in the main sectors. Moreover, the models include industry and state
effects.
Figure 4 presents estimates of the effect of union practices on labor productivity growth
as a function of the quantile τ of the conditional distribution. To improve the presen-
tation of the results, we do not report estimates on the coefficient on At , δ2(τ ), which
turn to be positive and significant across the quantiles of the conditional distribution.
The panels present results on the effect of capital acquisition rules on productivity.
In each graph, the continuous line denotes estimates of the effect of a work rule and
the dashed line with dots denotes estimates of the effect of a work rule after the
reforms.
The advantage of examining the distributional effect of the decentralization policies
can be seen in the left panel of Figure 4. While the evidence on technology indicates
no significant effect at the mean level (Table 3, column (4)), we see that the effect of
2013, 2:11
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Figure 4 The distributional effect of union practices on productivity growth. The quantiles of the
conditional distribution are indicated by τ . The shaded areas denote 90 percent (pointwise) confidence
intervals.
technology is associated with a weak, yet significant, productivity loss at the 0.1 quantile.
Moreover, we find that technology and training after the reforms have a significant and
positive effect at the upper tail of the conditional response distribution. These practices
do not seem to limit management effectiveness to conduct production operations in high-
productivity industries after the reforms were implemented.
5.5 Quantifying heterogeneous effects
The previous empirical evidence invites the following question: How harmful are
industry-wide practices on technology acquisition on labor productivity growth? In order
to answer this question, we estimate a variation of equation (4.2) and perform a series
of in-sample simulations. We replace the indicator variable W with a variable I defined
as in equation (3.1). By replacing W by I in equation (4.2), we obtain the following
equation:
yist = δ1Iist + δ2At + δ3(Iist × At) + x′istβ + αi + μs + uist . (5.1)
To address the concern of endogenous regressors and the possibility of heterogeneous
effects, we employ the quantile regression instrumental variable approach introduced in
Section 4.
Industry-wide work rules set working conditions for all potentially heterogeneous firms
in an industry, and therefore, the variable Iist → 1 may be interpreted as implying higher
barriers affecting firms’ efficiency and ability to organize production. Because Iist can
be seen as a continuous variable, we can estimate a counterfactual scenario. We let the
variable I be equal to 10% and then we recompute the model prediction for I equal to
11%. The difference between the model prediction which includes I = 0.10 and the model
prediction which includes I = 0.11 corresponds to our estimate of the effect of technology
acquisition practices on labor productivity growth.
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Figure 5 Quantifying the heterogeneous effect of practices on the incorporation of new technology
on labor productivity growth. The quantiles of the conditional distribution are indicated by τ .
We present the results in Figure 5. The figure restricts attention to the impact of tech-
nology acquisition practices on productivity growth in 55 manufacturing industries. The
mean productivity growth change is -0.9% in the period pre-reform, increasing to 1.0%
in the period post-reform. These estimates, however, miss important information. Union
practices on technology seem to have a modest negative effect of less than 1% among
low-productivity growth industries, but they reduce labor productivity among high-
productivity growth industries by 6.7%. The results for the period post-reform suggest
that productivity growth improves between 0.2% and 3.6% under weakened industry-wide
practices on the incorporation of new technology.
We extend the series of simulation exercises to the analysis of work rules on training.
Figure 6 investigates how harmful are industry-wide practices on training on productiv-
ity growth. As in the case of practices on technology, we find that training seems to have
a negligible effect among low productivity growth industries. Union practices on train-
ing in an economy promoting policies to weaken industry-wide agreements appears to
Table 5 Tests for the significance and equality of productivity growth rates
Effects of interest Quantiles Pair of quantiles
0.1 0.5 0.9 0.1–0.5 0.1–0.9 0.5–0.9
Technology pre-reform 0.983 0.774 0.000 0.991 0.888 0.000
Technology post-reform 0.623 0.002 0.000 0.779 0.283 0.026
Training pre-reform 0.995 0.987 0.998 0.996 0.999 1.000
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be beneficial for high productivity growth industries, although practices on technology
acquisition have a larger impact than practices on training.
Lastly, we test if the productivity changes reported in Figures 5 and 6 are significantly
different. We test two hypotheses.16 We first check whether productivity growth rates
are significantly different from zero at τ = {0.1, 0.5, 0.9}. Second, we test the equality
of gains across quantiles τ , considering pairs (τi, τj) for i = j. For instance, the fifth
column in Table 5 shows the p-value of a Wald-type test for the hypothesis that the pro-
ductivity growth rate at the 0.1 quantile is equal to the productivity growth rate at the
0.5 quantile. We find that (a) productivity growth induced by changes in technology and
training in the period after the reforms are statistically significantly different than zero
at the 0.9 quantile, and (b) we reject the equality of gains induced by changes in tech-
nology at the 0.5 and 0.9 quantiles. While these work practices do appear to increase
economic efficiency in the post-reform period, technology acquisition seems to have a
significant adverse effect on high-productivity growth industries under industry-wide
contracts.
6 Discussion and final remarks
This paper documents the effect of industry-wide practices on productivity. Argentina’s
policies to promote decentralization of the negotiation between firms and unions invite
an opportunity to answer questions for developing countries. We first examine the
hypothesis that unions add costs that limit firm’s organization and flexibility to incorpo-
rate physical capital. We find that industry-wide practices on displacement of workers,
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Figure 6 Quantifying the heterogeneous effect of practices on training on labor productivity growth.
The quantiles of the conditional distribution are indicated by τ .
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technology acquisition and training have a negative impact on productivity. Union prac-
tices on technology acquisition are heterogeneous, having a modest negative effect on
low-productivity growth industries and a significant adverse effect on high-productivity
growth industries. In the post-reform period however, productivity improves and work
practices do not appear to restrict economic efficiency.
The current analysis focuses on whether a practice was included in a contract, and
remains silent on the mechanisms through which union practices affect both produc-
tivity and within-industry productivity. This is due to the lack of suitable data. Further
research is also needed on other costs unions in developing countries may impose on
firm’s management. These factors are associated with disruptions in the production pro-
cess from strikes and pressures to increase wages and benefits. Nevertheless, we hope that
the evidence presented in this article will stimulate further research on the subject.
Endnotes
1See also classical papers by Allen (1987), Brown and Medoff (1978), Clark (1984), and
Groves et al. (1994). More recently, Dunne et al. (2010) investigate competition and
productivity in the US cement industry. Addison and Hirsch (1989) and Dowrick and
Spencer (1994) report evidence that relates unions with lower total factor productivity
growth in the US, where there is decentralized collective bargaining.
2Bester and Petrakis (1993) consider a similar assumption to the one adopted in this
paper. An alternative condition is to assume that all firms have the opportunity of
implementing an innovation. However, it has been shown that results are qualitatively
robust to changing this assumption (Haucap and Wey 2004, footnote 9).
3It is known that specific investments (e.g., training costs specific to the employer)
generate rents, and therefore, after the investment is made, unions may be able to obtain
higher benefits as a result of the firm’s investment (e.g., Grout 1984, Haucap and Wey
(2002, 2004, Ulph and Ulph (1994, 2001)); for a survey, see Malcomson 1997).
4The results are stated in Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 in a supplementary Appendix
not for publication, which is available from the author upon request.
5In the period 1973–1976, industry-wide bargaining was widespread including roughly
7 out of 10 contracts (Bronstein 1978). The negotiations were suspended in 1976, but
union contracts remained in force until they were renegotiated in 1988 and 1989.
6Argentina implemented a liberalization program, privatized public enterprises, and
deregulated the economy. The labor reform included the introduction of contracts for
temporary workers and a decentralization framework for collective bargaining. The
decree 2284 in 1991 deregulated collective labor agreements. The interested reader can
find additional details on labor market regulations and reform bills in Etchemendy
(2001) and Murillo (1997).
7Following standard practice, contracts were partitioned into subgroups in order to
increase the accuracy of the estimates. First, we stratified the population of union
contracts in H different stratas. Second, we determined the number of contracts, nh, to
be selected from each stratum h. Lastly, we obtained the samples. After we generated
random numbers for the contracts, we ordered them, and we selected the first nh
contracts. Additional details are available upon request.
8We do not include other industries in the analysis for two important reasons: (i)
industry data from the Argentine Census are available for the manufacturing sector and
are not available for other industries in the period 1974–1994 (with the exception of
Trade and Services); (ii) several public enterprises in the Electricity, Gas and Water
sector and Service sector were privatized in the 1990’s, and therefore, they were affected
by a policy not analyzed in this study.
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9Quebracho is a hard wood produced in the “Gran Chaco” region in northern
Argentina and Paraguay.
10Our definition is similar to the one used in Stiroh (2002). A number of studies have
focused on alternative measures of economic efficiency. For instance, Hsieh and Klenow
(2009) consider total factor productivity and estimate differences in marginal products
of labor and capital.
11It is convenient to consider the asymptotic covariance matrix of γˆ (Chernozhukov
and Hansen 2006). The requirement is that A be any uniformly positive definite matrix,





12Note that the models do not include time effects. This is to avoid issues of linear
dependence with the variable of interest ‘After the reforms’, At . When we carefully
handle non-singularities in the design matrix, we obtain similar results for the
coefficients δ1 and δ3 to the ones presented in Table 3. These results are available upon
request.
13The Appendix presents robustness checks.
14It is known that contract’s duration is an important component in the collective
bargaining process (see, e.g., Dye 1985 and Murphy 1992). The literature documents
several factors affecting contract’s duration, including cost-of-living adjustments and
industry-specific transaction costs. In Argentina, however, the duration of union
contracts were dramatically affected by the “ultra-activity” law, which allows contracts
to be extended if unions and firms do not agree to a revision. In the period 1975–1998,
approximately 90 percent of the contracts were of “indefinite” duration.
15The theoretical justification of using contract’s duration to instrument the
endogenous policy variable also relies on the fact that contracts were extended despite
that unions and firms did not agree to a revision. This can be interpreted as implying
that productivity in an industry might not be associated with contracts’ duration. It may,
however, influence productivity in the first year, when firms and unions were less
uncertain about contract’s duration. We address this concern by using the length of
contracts in other industries located in other states.
16We implemented a Wald-type test following closely the ideas discussed in Koenker
(2005, §3.3), further elaborated in Lamarche (2008).
Appendix: data set description and sources
Data sources
The source of contract data is Argentine Law, Collective Bargaining. Some contracts are
available at the site of the Ministerio de Trabajo de la Nación Argentina http://www.
trabajo.gov.ar/. The main source of output and labor data is the Economic National
Census (CNE) conducted by the Argentine National Institute of Statistics and Census
(INDEC). The CNE was conducted in 1974, 1985, and 1994. The source for data on
employment is EPH, which is also conducted by INDEC. This survey, which is similar to
the CPS in the US, is a large national survey comprised of interviews of 30.000 households
in each wave. The source of gross geographical product is SAREP, Secretaría de Asisten-
cia para la Reforma Provincial. The source of per capita GDP (millions of pesos at 1993
prices) in Figure 1 is Ieral, Ministry of Finance and ECLAC (Argentina). The source of
data on population is INDEC (Censo Nacional de Población 1980 y 1991).
A few tables and figures contain information obtained from other sources. The total
number of contracts and beneficiaries in Table 1 is from Aldao-Zapiola et al. 1994.
Lastly, the productivity index presented in Figure 1 is from Asociación de Fábricas the
Automotores (ADEFA) and Catalano and Novick’s (1998) Tables 2.4 and 2.5. ADEFA
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reports annual production, employment and productivity per worker in the Argentine
automobile industry.
Description of the variables
The collective agreements are classified according to the four digit level of the United
Nations International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC, Rev.3). The group of vari-
ables labeled basic controls in the regressions include other contract characteristics: (a)
type of contract (indicators for firm-level contract, industry-level contract, or national-
level contract); (b) type of worker covered by the contract (e.g., indicators for blue collar
workers, white collar workers, etc.); (c) geographical coverage of the contract (indicators
for whether the contract is binding within a firm, a state, a region, or the nation). The vec-
tor of additional controls includes the state-variant variables considered in Galiani et al.
(2005). These variables are logarithm of population, the real gross geographical product
per capita, and a measure of the state’s industry composition. The industry mix is defined
Table 6Additional empirical evidence on the effect of individual work rules on productivity
Labor productivity specifications
Individual working rules Level Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Displacement -0.262∗ -0.359† -0.224‡ -0.198 -0.323† -0.276
(0.092) (0.168) (0.114) (0.137) (0.142) (0.263)
After reforms 2.962∗ 2.031∗ 3.140∗ 1.841∗ 0.970‡ 1.911∗
(0.179) (0.374) (0.155) (0.301) (0.494) (0.307)
Displacement after reforms 0.641∗ 0.709∗ 0.175 0.200 0.348‡ 0.302
(0.118) (0.200) (0.146) (0.210) (0.171) (0.309)
Categories -0.065 -0.350∗ -0.415∗ -0.289 -0.385† -0.572
(0.085) (0.111) (0.109) (0.211) (0.181) (0.423)
After reforms 2.973∗ 1.956∗ 3.023∗ 1.868∗ 1.062† 1.987∗
(0.158) (0.353) (0.118) (0.314) (0.475) (0.369)
Categories after reforms 0.509∗ 0.686∗ 0.260† 0.074 0.039 0.041
(0.094) (0.161) (0.122) (0.201) (0.226) (0.345)
Technology 0.233† -0.001 -0.062 -0.267 -0.318 -0.357
(0.105) (0.153) (0.171) (0.193) (0.216) (0.233)
After reforms 3.024∗ 2.110∗ 2.849∗ 1.624∗ 0.783 1.600∗
(0.187) (0.357) (0.178) (0.320) (0.512) (0.359)
Technology after reforms 0.412∗ 0.510† 0.745∗ 0.725∗ 0.751† 1.046†
(0.130) (0.180) (0.209) (0.246) (0.266) (0.417)
Training -0.189 -0.255 -0.571∗ -0.198 -0.247 -0.789∗
(0.111) (0.163) (0.155) (0.156) (0.151) (0.246)
After reforms 3.108∗ 2.227∗ 2.803∗ 1.777∗ 0.958‡ 1.594∗
(0.165) (0.340) (0.145) (0.246) (0.507) (0.211)
Training after reforms 0.393∗ 0.397∗ 0.965∗ 0.357† 0.397‡ 1.153∗
(0.110) (0.131) (0.180) (0.158) (0.213) (0.317)
Basic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional controls No Yes No No Yes No
State effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry effects No No Yes No No Yes
Number of observations 1945 1030 1945 1090 899 1090
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as the share of employment in the main aggregate sectors: manufacturing, trade, services,
construction, and other sectors.
Additional empirical evidence
We now present robustness checks. In all the variants of the model, we find that the effect
of technology after the reform is positive and significant, suggesting that decentralized
negotiation on technology acquisition lead to productivity gains. The table also illustrates
the importance of controlling for observed heterogeneity. Column (1) in Table 6 shows
that industry-wide practices on technology acquisition tend to increase productivity. As
expected, however, these results are not robust to the inclusion of additional controls for
regional disparities. Finally, Table 7 presents evidence that instruments and endogenous
variables are strongly correlated.
Table 7 First-stage regression results of the effect of individual work rules on productivity
Endogenous IV Labor productivity specifications
working rule Level Growth
Coefficient Std error Coefficient Std error
Displacement I 0.119∗ 0.012 0.119∗ 0.012
II 0.041∗ 0.013 0.041∗ 0.012
III 0.003 0.008 0.003 0.008
Displacement After I -0.001 0.011 -0.002 0.011
II 0.168∗ 0.011 0.167∗ 0.011
III 0.001 0.007 0.001 0.007
Categories I 0.105∗ 0.010 0.106∗ 0.009
II 0.026† 0.011 0.027∗ 0.010
III 0.013‡ 0.007 0.012† 0.006
Categories After I -0.012 0.009 -0.011 0.009
II 0.157∗ 0.010 0.157∗ 0.009
III 0.008 0.006 0.008 0.006
Technology I 0.119∗ 0.011 0.120∗ 0.010
II 0.042∗ 0.012 0.043∗ 0.011
III 0.003 0.007 0.002 0.007
Technology After I -0.003 0.011 -0.002 0.010
II 0.167∗ 0.012 0.167∗ 0.011
III 0.002 0.007 0.002 0.007
Training I 0.111∗ 0.018 0.112∗ 0.018
II 0.032‡ 0.019 0.033‡ 0.019
III 0.008 0.012 0.007 0.012
Training After I -0.012 0.018 -0.011 0.018
II 0.156∗ 0.019 0.157∗ 0.019
III 0.008 0.012 0.007 0.012
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
State effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1030 1030 899 899
The endogenous variables are instrumented by average number of employees covered by union contracts in other industries
and states (I), the average number of employees covered by union contracts in other industries and states in the period after the
reforms were introduced (II), and average length of contracts in other industries and states (III). Controls include the variables in
Table 3 and an indicator for the period after the reforms were introduced. The symbols ‡,†,∗ denote statistically different from
zero at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level of significance.
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